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Public Good Overprovision
by a Manipulative Provider
ABSTRACT
We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations
of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the usersí private information, she
beneÖts from manipulating the collective information received from all users when com-
municating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines
the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative,
the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovision occurs with a manipulative
provider. With overprovision, not only high-valuation users, but also low-valuation users
may obtain positive rentsóusers may prefer facing a manipulative provider.
JEL ClassiÖcation: D82, D86, H41
Keywords: Information Manipulation, Public Goods
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1 Introduction
Since Samuelsonís pioneering work (1954), analyzing distortions in the provision of public
goods has become a classical topic in economics (e.g. La§ont 1988). The conventional
understanding is that the usersí incentives result in an ìunderprovisionîóthe direction of
distortion in the public good provision is downward. For instance, Comes and Sandler
(1996) note that ìthe tendency for public goods to be provided at suboptimal levels is a
celebrated result in public economics.î Casual observations, however, indicate that, in real
life, there are cases where some public goods and services are often ìoverprovidedîóthe
direction of distortion in the public good provision is upward, instead of downward.
As an example, consider the class-action lawsuits in which a group of victims consolidate
their claims into a single lawsuit. A criticism against such collective litigation procedures is
that they often lead to an excessive amount of litigation. As pointed out by legal studies,
such as Mullenix (2014), in many cases relentlessly pursued by class-action attorneys, some
class members do not care much about the outcome of their cases. The studies also report
that excessive amount of litigation is often linked to small compensations for class members
and large fees for class attorneys.1 This, in fact, is one of the central reasons that eventually
led the United States Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, removing the
class-action lawsuits from the jurisdiction of state courts which are deemed to be over-
friendly to attorneys representing plainti§s.
Industrial lobbying is another instance for over-provision. As pointed out by studies in
political science, the amount of lobbying can signiÖcantly exceed what would be e¢cient
for the industry.2 Industrial lobbying expenditure in the United States has reached nearly
$3 billion,3 and lobbyists are known for ináating the size of their services. For example,
Collander (2013) reports that almost all lobbyists representing the companies in the defence
industry are devoted to ináate scales of military procurement and acquisition. As pointed
out by Hansen (2012), oversized lobbying activities often lead to ine¢cient use of public
resources, such as constructing of a ìbridge to nowhere.î
The services in the examples above are non-rivalrous. That is, a single service by the
provider (a lawyer or a lobbyist) beneÖts multiple users (clients) who are in the same
groupóeach user may value the service di§erently, but they do not compete for it. These
1See Ulen (2011) and Redish (2014) for example.
2See Ainsworth (1993) for examples of trade association lobbying e§orts which do not necessarily reáect
the demand from their general membership.
3See Drutman (2015).
2
services are, therefore, public goods. Then, from an economic perspective, these excessive
public good provisions are rather puzzling, because according to the standard theory in the
literature, public goods are expected to be underprovided.
The objective of this paper is to identify a new economic mechanism that results in
overprovision of a public good rather than underprovision. We study this mechanism in
an agency framework of public good provision with private information. In our model,
a provider (the principal) produces a public good for the consumption of multiple users
(agents) in exchange for monetary payments from them. Each userís valuation for the
public good is his private information, and after all users report their valuations to the
provider, she produces the good according to the collective valuation reported by the users.
As in the standard model of screening, a user with a high valuation for the good receives
an information rent not to misrepresent his true valuation. In order to reduce this informa-
tion rent, the providerís second-best contract distorts the size of the public good downward.
Except for the case where every user claims that his valuation of the public good is high, the
provider lowers provision of the public good from the e¢cient level in the optimal contract.
This is in line with the literatureís traditional result in public good provisionóthe public
good is underprovided in equilibrium.
This result, however, is under the assumption that, while the users of the public good are
opportunistic, the provider is not. Such an assumption seems to be naive. While each user
has private information about his valuation of the public good, at the point of producing the
public good, the provider is the only party that has information about all usersí collective
valuation of the good. If possible (and proÖtable), the public good provider may seize the
opportunity to misrepresent the collective information sent by the users, by falsifying the
information received from one user when communicating with another user.
In practice, providers of public goods do not all have access to equally e§ective manip-
ulation opportunities. For some public goods or services provided directly by government
organizations, for example, information manipulation may not be easy. With all bureau-
cratic procedures and ìred tapes,î such organizations operate in rigid environments, and
may not be able to easily manipulate information they collect. On the other hand, op-
erating environments for the public good providers we mentioned earlier may not be as
rigid, and thus it may not be as hard for them to engage in manipulation. In the case of
class-action lawsuits, attorneys do not make individual class memberís information public
due to ìattorney-client privilege,î which may enable them to manipulate collective informa-
tion. For business lobbying, the lobbyist-client relationship is similar to the attorney-client
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relationship,4 and manipulating activities by lobbyists are not entirely unknown. Hansen
(2012) reports that lobbyists act mainly based on their ìrent-seekingî incentives, noting
that they have a large stake in manipulating ìlobbying-related information.î
We take the public good providerís incentive to manipulate the collective information
into account in our model. We identify that, when the provider announces the collective
valuations to the users, she has an incentive to exaggerate itóin particular, the provider
has an incentive to make a user with a low value for the public good think that the other
usersí valuations are high. The public good providerís incentive to manipulate information
is anticipated by the users when contracting with her. Such an anticipation provides a high-
valuation user with a stronger incentive to misrepresent his own valuation. In other words,
there is a tension between a userís incentive to misrepresent his private information and
the providerís incentive to misrepresent her collective information. To ease this tension, the
public good provider must convince the users that she would not manipulate the collective
information reported by them.
One way to convince the users that the public good provider will not falsify their reports
is designing a bunching contract that pools di§erent collective information at the same level
of the public good. The provider will not have a reason to manipulate if the public good and
the payment levels do not change with her manipulation. More interestingly, the provider
can also eliminate her incentive to manipulate by ináating the provision of the public good
and leaving a positive rent to users with low valuations. Our result shows that, depending
on the likelihood of di§erent user valuations, it is optimal for the provider to implement
bunching or overprovision to convince the users that she will not manipulate.
Manipulability of information may have unexpected winners and losers. The provider
must convince the users that she will not falsify the reported collective information, and
this consideration imposes an additional constraint on the providerís design problem on
top of the standard incentive conditions. Modifying the second-best contract to satisfy this
new constraint entails a lower payo§ for the provider. An examination of how the provider
modiÖes the second-best contract also reveals the e§ects of the manipulation opportunities
on the usersí payo§s. Larger public good sizes lead to larger information rents for high-
valuation users. In addition, even low-valuation users may end up with positive rent under
the optimal manipulation-proof contract. In other words, while the public good provider is
worse o§ for having the opportunity to manipulate the information reported by the users,
the users themselves may beneÖt from the providerís ability to manipulate.
4See Armstrong and Mathews (2008).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related
studies. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 outlines the optimal contract without the
providerís manipulation opportunities (the second-best contract), and shows that the public
good is underprovided in this case. Section 5 demonstrates that the second-best contract
may be prone to the providerís manipulation and characterizes the optimal manipulation-
proof contract. Section 6 discusses the welfare e§ects of the providerís manipulation oppor-
tunities. Section 7 concludes with some remarks. Proofs are in Appendix.
2 Related Literature
It is a classical result that public goods are underprovided. Under symmetric information
and voluntary contributions, this underprovision result obtains when comparing the non-
cooperative equilibrium outcome to the cooperative one (e.g. Bergstrom et al. 1986).5
Under asymmetric information and voluntary participation, the underprovision arises from
a trade-o§ between e¢ciency and information rents (e.g. Mailath and Postlewaite 1990)6
Consequently, the literature views overprovision as an ëanomalyí. The theoretical lit-
erature has studied this anomaly mainly under symmetric information. This paperís con-
tribution is to provide a rationale for overprovision that is due to ëendogenous private
informationíóinformation manipulation by a public good provider.7
Focusing on the preferences of economic agents, Buchanan and Kafoglis (1963), Diamond
and Mirrlees (1973) and Sadka (1977) discuss necessary conditions on those preferences for
an overprovision to arise. There are studies considering strategic tax policies, demonstrating
that overprovision may arise when there is tax exporting (e.g. Gerking and Mutti 1981),
when public goods are inputs in production (e.g. Dhillon et al. 2007), or when policy
makers have Leviathan tendencies (e.g., Mintz and Tulkens, 1996). All explanations in
these studies abstract from private information.
5Cheikbossian and Sand-Zantman (2011) show that the underprovision result even persists with repeated
interactions that involve imperfect monitoring, while Teoh (1997) shows that information disclosure worsens
the free-riding problem that underlies the underprovision.
6With forced, involuntary participation, Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) demonstrate that the e¢cient
level of the public good can be implemented in dominant strategies. Green and La§ont (1977) also study
e¢ciency in public good provisions by characterizing incentive compatible mechanisms in dominant strate-
gies. Under Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions, díAspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) show that,
with forced participation, such an outcome can even be achieved with budget-balanced transfers.
7Bierbrauer and Winkelmann (2019) study public good overprovision from a mechanism design perspec-
tive. They do not, however, consider the public good providerís endogenous private information.
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Our modeling of manipulation is similar to Dequiedt and Martimort (2015) and Ak-
barpour and Li (2020). These papers focus on manipulation in environments with private
goods.8 Considering a principal who can falsify received information in a multi-agent frame-
work with correlated private information, Dequiedt and Martimort (2016) point out that
full rent extraction through yardstick competition is no longer possible.9 As a result, simple
sell-out contracts are optimal in a vertical framework of an upstream manufacturer dealing
with a retailing network under a wide range of settings.
Akbarpour and Li (2020) study manipulation-proof auction design. They demonstrate
that the sealed-bid second-price auction is susceptible to undetectable manipulation, be-
cause the auctioneer can overstate the second-highest bid to increase the payment from the
winner. In contrast, no such manipulating incentive arises for the Örst-price auction. They,
moreover, develop a general formalization of undetectable manipulation by a mechanism
designer, which also provides a micro foundation of the manipulation-proofness constraints
that we apply in our framework of public goods. The manipulation opportunities in a pub-
lic good setting are, however, more limited than under private consumption, because the
provided level of a public good is naturally observed and consumed by all users in the group.
As we show, this limited form of manipulability has nevertheless an adverse e§ect on the
principalís abilities to extract rents. They are economically signiÖcant in that, depending
on parameter constellations, they lead to an overprovision of public goods.
Our paper is also related to the studies on informed principal problem following the
agentís hidden action. In Demski and Sappington (1993), the agent exerts a costly e§ort,
but the result of the e§ort is observed only by the principal, who may have an incentive
to misrepresent the result. They show that the principal may have to reward the agent for
unfavorable result. In a multi-agent setting, Sridhar and Balachandran (1997) show that if
result of the internal agentís e§ort is not observed by the external agent, it can be a source
of distortion when the principal contracts with the external agent. In these papers, the
principalís manipulation incentive is associated with the agentís hidden action, whereas in
ours, the principalís incentive stems from the agentsí private information.10
8See also a paper by Dequiedt and Martimort (2006) which constructs a non-manipulable mechanism for
a benevolent public good provider.
9CrÈmer and McLean (1985, 1988) show that, when the agentsí types are correlated, a non-manipulative
principal could fully extract the agentsí information rents by conditioning her transaction with one agent to
the information transmitted by another agent.
10Lacker and Weinberg (1989) study a case where a costly hidden action can privatize public information.
See also Strausz (2006) and Shin (2017) for studies incorporating the principalís incentive in agency problems.
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3 Public Good Provision Model
We present a model of public good provision with a provider (the principal) and two users
(the agents). The providerís cost of producing size q ! 0 of the public good is given
by c(q), where c(") is a continuously di§erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex
function.11 We assume that c(") satisÖes the Inada conditions: c(0) = 0, limq!0 c0 (q) = 0,
and limq!1 c0 (q) =1. User k 2 f1; 2g values q units of the public good by %kq. The size of
the public good q is veriÖable and contractible, whereas each userís valuation parameter %k is
his private information (his type). The types are independently and identically distributed.
SpeciÖcally, a user has the high valuation %h for the public good with probability ' 2 (0; 1),
and the low valuation %l > 0 with probability 1' ', where *% ( %h ' %l > 0.
In line with the examples in the introduction, we consider the public good provider as
a proÖt maximizer.12 Accordingly, the providerís and user kís payo§s are respectively
2X
k=1
pk ' c (q) and %kq ' pk,
where pk is the payment from user k to the public good provider.
The collective value of the public good depends on the realized types of the two users.
We are either in the high-value state (H) where both users have a high valuation for the
public good, or in the low-value state (L) where both users have a low valuation, or in
the intermediate-value state (M) where the two users have di§erent valuations. For each
of these collective-valuation states, we can Önd the Örst-best sizes of the public good that
maximizes the sum of the providerís and the usersí payo§s. The Örst-best public good sizes
satisfy the Samuelson conditionóthe marginal cost of producing this Örst-best level is equal
to the sum of the marginal values:
c0(q$H) = 2%h; c
0(q$M ) = %h + %l; c
0(q$L) = 2%l:
If the public good provider could directly observe the usersí valuations, she would choose
to produce these Örst-best quantities to maximize the beneÖts of the public good net of its
production costs. However, because these valuations are private information for the users,
the provider has to give them the incentive to reveal their valuations truthfully. For this
purpose, the provider o§ers a contract C that conditions the size of the public good and the
11Our public good provision model is similar to the one in La§ont and Martimort (2000).
12Our qualitative results remain unchanged if the provider is modeled as a welfare-maximizing government
raising distortionary taxes to Önance the goodís production (as in La§ont and Tirole, 1993).
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payments from the users on their reports about valuations. In what follows, we denote by
pi) the payment charged to a user of type i 2 fh; lg, when all usersí reports indicate the
collective value as 0 2 fH;M;Lg: Similarly, q) is the public good size when the collective
value is indicated as 0 2 fH;M;Lg by the usersí reports. Hence, a contract C is a collection
of payments and public good sizes as below:
C ( f(phH ; qH); (plM ; qM ); (phM ; qM ); (plL; qL)g:











where k;'k 2 f1; 2g, i; j 2 fh; lg and 0 2 fH;M;Lg: We postulate that the public good
providerís o§er is constrained by ìfairnessî restrictions. In practice, there are agencies, such
as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), that monitor Örms to prevent them from engaging
in unfair business practices toward consumers. It is also well-documented in experimental
studies that players in the same positions care about being treated symmetrically.13
Finally, we assume that each user has an option to opt out, after learning the level of the
public good and the required payment to the provider. If a user chooses to opt out, then
the game ends without any public good provision and payments, so that all parties receive
their reservation payo§s of zero. We discuss the importance of the symmetric treatment
and opportunity to opt out assumptions in our conclusion.
The timing of the interaction is summarized as follows:
1. The public good provider o§ers contract C to the users.
2. Each user reports his valuation i 2 fh; lg to the provider.
3. The provider reports the collective valuation 0 2 fH;M;Lg to the users.
4. Payments are made and the public good is provided, if the users do not opt out.
In the next section, we analyze a non-manipulative public good provider, who would
choose the public good and payment levels that would truthfully reáect the reported types
of the users in stage 3. This benchmark case leads to the standard result that the public
good is underprovided and the high-valuation users get information rents. In the subsequent
section, we show that such an underprovision invites the providerís manipulation incentive
in stage 3.14 We then will show that the optimal manipulation-proof contract may exhibit
overprovision of the public good and leave a positive rent even for a low-valuation user.
13See, for example, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997). La§ont and Martimort (1998) adopt a similar restric-
tion justiÖed by limited communication.
14We assume that that it is too costly for the users to directly communicate with each other.
8
4 Non-Manipulative Public Good Provider
We discuss the benchmarkóthe public good sizes in the optimal contract when the provider
cannot manipulate information reported from the users. Here, the providerís constraints in
contracting for the public good provision are the usersí participation and truthful reports
on their valuation of the public good.
The public good providerís expected payo§ can be written as the expected payments
that she will receive from the users net of the cost of producing the public good:
'2 [2phH ' c (qH)] + ' (1' ') [phM + plM ' c (qM )] (P)
+(1' ')' [plM + phM ' c (qM )] + (1' ')2 [2plL ' c (qL)]
=
n
'22phH + 2' (1' ') phM + 2' (1' ') plM + (1' ')2 2plL
o
| {z }
expected payment from the users
'
n
'2c (qH) + 2' (1' ') c (qM ) + (1' ')2 c (qL)
o
| {z }
expected cost of production
As mentioned above, the non-manipulative provider chooses the contract that maximizes
her expected payo§ subject to two sets of constraints for the users. The source of the Örst set
of constraints is the voluntary participation of the users. The following pairs of participation
constraints ensure that high and low-valuation users would not opt out of the contract after
learning the intended public good and the payment levels:
%hqH ' phH ! 0; (PChH)
%hqM ' phM ! 0; (PChM )
for a high-valuation user and
%lqM ' plM ! 0; (PClM )
%lqL ' plL ! 0; (PClL)
for a low-valuation user. In addition, to induce the users to reveal their true valuations, the
following Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions must be satisÖed:
' (%hqH ' phH) + (1' ') (%hqM ' phM ) (ICh)
! ' (%hqM ' plM ) + (1' ') (%hqL ' plL) ;
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for a high-valuation user and
' (%lqM ' plM ) + (1' ') (%lqL ' plL) (ICl)
! 'max f%lqH ' phH ; 0g+ (1' ')max f%lqM ' phM ; 0g ;
for a low-valuation user. The ëmaxí operators on the right hand side (RHS) of ICl reáect the
possibility that a low-valuation user may misrepresent his type as type %h, and opt out after
being informed of the other userís type (thus after learning the realized size of the public
good and the payment level in the contract).15 As shown by Matthews and Postlewaite
(1989) and Forges (1999), quitting rights of the users require such strengthening of the
incentive compatibility constraints. Notice that we do not need these ëmaxí operators on
the RHS of ICh, because PClM and PClL imply that opting out would be suboptimal for
a high-valuation user after misrepresenting his type as %l:
When the public good provider cannot manipulate information from the users, she o§ers
the second-best contract that maximizes her expected payo§ (P) subject to the participa-
tion and incentive compatibility constraints presented above. We characterize the optimal
outcome in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract Cn o§ered by the non-manipulative provider entails
the public good levels identiÖed by the following Örst-order conditions:
c0(qnH) = 2%h,
c0(qnM ) = max
(














A high-valuation userís expected rent is strictly positive unless qnM = q
n
L = 0, and a low-
valuation user gets zero rent.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If both users have high valuations, the optimal size of the public good coincides with the
e¢cient oneóconforming to the well-known ìno distortion at the topî result of standard
screening models. Incentive compatibility is the source of the information rent for the
15Alternatively, we can impose a limited liability constraint that a contract-abiding user is assured a
positive ex post payo§. In that case, the RHS of (ICl) is replaced with '($lqH!phH)+(1! ') ($lqM!phM );
and our results will not change.
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high-valuation user. As in the standard screening model, a user with high-valuation can
command information rent by misrepresenting his type as the low-valuation. To prevent
this user from misrepresenting his type, the provider must leave an information rent to
him. The providerís optimal contract reduces the magnitude of this information rent by
distorting the size of the public good downward whenever at least one of the users report a
low type, i.e. whenever the collective valuation is low or intermediate. This underprovision
of public good can take an extreme form of a shut down (qnL = q
n
M = 0); and a high-valuation
user obtains no information rent. This indeed is the case when the likelihood that users
are high-valuation type is su¢ciently large. When that likelihood is not large enough, the
public good levels are strictly positive, although they are distorted downwards.
The binding constraints in the non-manipulative providerís problem are the participation
constraints of the low-valuation user, (PClM ) and (PClL), and the incentive compatibility
constraint of the high-valuation user, (ICh)ósee the proof of Proposition 1. The payments
from the users are obtained from these binding constraints:
plM = %lqM ; plL = %lqL and
'phH + (1' ') phM = '[%hqH '*%qM ] + (1' ')[%hqM '*%qL]:
Notice that, in the second-best contract Cn; a high-valuation userís ex post payments to
the provider, phH and phM ; have some degree of freedom. We point out this áexibility
in allocation of the payment here, because it will be exploited in the next section, where
manipulation by the public good provider is an issue.
Our discussion here on the public good size is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If the public good provider is non-manipulative, then the optimal contract
entails only under-provision of the public good.
5 Manipulative Public Good Provider
In the previous section, we derived the public good providerís optimal contract to the users
under the assumption that she cannot manipulate the information revealed by the users.
We now argue that this assumption is not innocuousóafter learning that both users have
low valuation, the provider may have an incentive to misrepresent this information in a way
that is undetectable by the users.16
16Using the words in Akbarpour and Li (2020), the second-best contract is ìnot credibleî in our model
when the public good provider is manipulative.
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Although the users cannot communicate with each other, they can detect certain forms
of manipulation by the provider. It is clear that when 0 = H; misrepresenting it as 0 = L
will be detected by all users. Likewise, misrepresenting 0 = L as 0 = H will be detected.
Also, when 0 = M; the provider cannot misrepresent it as 0 = H or L: If 0 = M is
misrepresented as 0 = H; then the low-valuation user will detect the providerís false claim.
Likewise, the provider cannot misrepresent 0 =M as 0 = L; because her manipulation then
will be detected by the high-valuation user.
In our model, the provider is able to misrepresent the collective valuation as 0 =M when
0 = H or L: Neither user will be able to detect the providerís manipulation in such a case.
As will be shown below, when 0 = H; the provider has no incentive to misrepresent it as
0 =M: When 0 = L; however, the providerís incentive to misrepresent it as 0 =M arises.
That is, while there are two cases in which the provider is able to manipulate information,
it is when the collective valuation is low that her incentive is an issue. The public good
provider has an incentive to ëexaggerateí the collective valuation in order to increase the
size of the good, while having no incentive to decrease it.17
To see the providerís incentive to manipulate, suppose that each user sends a message
to the contract indicating that he has a low valuation for the public good. If the provider
behaves truthfully and reports the collective valuation as low, the contract would commit
her to producing public good level qL in exchange for receiving payment plL from each of
the users. The provider, however, would have another option if she is able to manipulate
the information that she collects from one user when communicating with the other one.
If she pretends to each user that the other user had reported to have a high valuation, she
would instead commit to producing qM and would receive plM from each of the users. For
this manipulation not to be proÖtable, the providerís contract should satisfy the following
incentive compatibility constraint for the provider :
2plL ' c (qL) ! 2plM ' c (qM ) : (PICL)
As shown above, in the second-best contract Cn, the payments plL and plM are determined






M : Accordingly, when both
usersí valuations are low (0 = L); the public good providerís payo§ in Cn is 2%lqn ' c (qn) ;
where qn 2 fqnL; q
n
Mg depending on whether or not she misrepresents the collective valuation
of the public good. If the provider chooses to truthfully announce the collective valuation
of the users, then her payo§ is:
2%lq
n
L ' c (q
n
L) :
17This is in line with the examples mentioned in the introduction.
12




M ' c (q
n
M ) :
Notice that 2%lq ' c (q) is concave in q and it is maximized at the Örst-best level of the
pubic good q$L. In the second best contract C
n, qnL is set smaller than q
$
L. Notice, however,
from Proposition 1 that, when the high and low valuations are equally likely (' = 1=2), the
second best level of qM coincides with q$L, and thus:
2%lq
n
M ' c (q
n
M ) = 2%lq
$




L ' c (q
n
L) :
It follows from the continuity of the second-best contract that, as long as ' is su¢ciently
close to 1/2, the provider would prefer misrepresenting 0 = L as 0 =M under the second-
best mechanism. We formalize this discussion with the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The second-best contract Cn violates (PICL) if and only if ' 2 (';'), where
' ( (%l + %h)=(2%h) > 1=2 and ' 2 (0; 1=2).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Again, the second best contract Cn is prone to the public good providerís misrepresen-
tation of the usersí collective valuationówhen both users report that their valuations are
low to the provider, the provider has an incentive to claim to each user that the other userís
valuation is high. According to Lemma 1, such an incentive of the provider is an issue for
intermediate values of the likelihood that a userís valuation is high: ' 2 (';'): Within
this interval, the public good level qM is close enough to q$L and thus the provider has an
incentive to misrepresent 0 = L as 0 =M after she receives each userís information.
More intuitively, for extreme values of ' the provider has no incentive to manipulate
the collective valuation in Cn: When ' + '; it is unlikely that the collective value is high
(0 = H), and thus distortion in qL to reduce a high-valuation usersí information rent in Cn
is smallóas a result, the providerís manipulation incentive to misrepresent 0 = L as 0 =M
does not arise in Cn: Likewise, when ' ! '; it is likely that the collective value is high.
Therefore, to reduce the high-valuation usersí rents, not only qL; but also qM is distorted
signiÖcantly downward in Cnóas a result, the provider has no incentive to misrepresent
0 = L as 0 = M in Cn: When ' 2 (';'); the providerís incentive to manipulate arises
because qL is distorted relatively more severely than qM :
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Figure 1 below illustrates the range of qM within which the manipulation incentive of
the public good provider arises.
qM
2șl qL – c(qL)
qL*
2șl qM – c(qM)
qL
The range of qM within which the public good provider
has an incentive to misrepresent γ = L as γ =M.
)(~ Lqq
Fig 1. The public good sizes and the providerís incentive.
It is noteworthy what would go wrong for the second-best contract Cn when (PICL)
constraint is violated and the public good provider indeed manipulates the information that
she receives from the low-valuation users. In that case, a user would end up with a higher
level of the public good (qnM instead of q
n
L) and make a higher payment (plM = %lq
n
M instead
of plL = %lqnL) to the provider. Notice that a low-valuation user would be indi§erent to this
manipulation, because the binding participation constraints guarantee that he receives no
rent whether the provider manipulates or not. Thus, the providerís misrepresentation is
Pareto-improving ex post. The providerís manipulation incentive, however, is anticipated
by the users, and as a result, Cn becomes no longer incentive compatible for a high-valuation












































The strict inequality above implies that (ICh) will be violatedóthe real cost of the providerís
manipulation is due to the violation of the incentive compatibility for a high-valuation user.
Hence a high-valuation user, anticipating the providerís misrepresentation of the collective
value, will require a larger information rent to reveal his private information truthfully.
In addition to the manipulation opportunity that we identiÖed above for the low-value
state, there is one more undetectable way for the provider to manipulate information. When
both users report that they have high valuations, the provider can claim to each user that
the other user reported his valuation as low. To ensure that the provider will not pursue
this manipulation, the following incentive compatibility constraint should be satisÖed in
addition to (PICL):
2phH ' c (qH) ! 2phM ' c (qM ) : (PICH)
It is easier to curtail the providerís manipulation incentive in the high-value state in com-
parison to her manipulation incentives in the low-value state. In other words, (PICH) is a
less demanding constraint than (PICL). As mentioned in the previous section, when the in-
centive compatibility constraint (ICh) pins down the expected payment 'phH+(1' ') phM
from a high-valuation user, it still leaves some degree of freedom in determining individ-
ual payment levels of phH and phM . In Lemma 2 below, we show that the manipulative
providerís contract can make use of this freedom to satisfy (PICH) without violating the
usersí incentive compatibility or participation constraints, for the relevant levels of the
public good.
Lemma 2 Consider public good levels such that qL + qM + qH + q$H , payments plL and
plM satisfying (PClL) and (PClM ), and 'phH +(1' ') phM given by binding (ICh). There
exist phH and phM that satisfy (PChH), (PChM ), (ICl) and (PICH).
Proof. See Appendix C.
According to Lemma 2, the public good providerís manipulation incentive is toward
one directionówhile having an incentive to exaggerate the collective valuation, she has no
incentive to understate it. Again, inducing high-valuation usersí truthful reports requires
downward distortions in the public good sizes for low-valuation users, which in turn give
the provider the incentive to exaggerate the collective valuation of the users. Although the
provider is able to misrepresent 0 = H as 0 =M; she has no incentive to do so in Cn:
In light of the previous two lemmas, we can conclude that the optimal manipulation-
proof contract is the second-best one, Cn, if the value of ' is small or large (' + ' or
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' ! '). The remaining task is identifying the optimal contract for an intermediate range of
', where the public good providerís manipulation incentive is an issue. This contract should
maximize the providerís expected payo§ in (P) subject to the providerís incentive compat-
ibility constraints, as well as the usersí participation constraints and the usersí incentive
compatibility constraints.
Since the second-best contract Cn violates (PICL) for ' 2 (';'); within this range
of '; perhaps the most natural contract that would eliminate the providerís incentive to
manipulate is a bunching contract that does not distinguish between the case where both
users report low valuation for the public good and the case where only one of them reports
low valuation, i.e., qL = qM : In this way, a low-valuation user and the provider end up
with the same public good and payment levels for both 0 = L and 0 = Mówith this
bunching, there is no reason for the provider to misrepresent 0 = L as 0 = M: With our
next proposition, we show that this is indeed the optimal contract for the provider when a
user is more likely to be the high-valuation type.
Proposition 2 For ' 2 (1=2; '), the optimal contract Cm o§ered by the manipulative
provider entails a bunching outcome with under-provision of the public good:
c0 (qmH ) = 2%h,
c0 (qmM ) = c








A high-valuation userís expected rent is strictly positive unless qmM = q
m
L = 0, and a low-
valuation user gets zero rent.
Proof. See Appendix D.
When all users have low-valuation, the provider produces qmL = q
m







M ) from each user regardless of whether she manipulates the reported
information or not. It is straightforward to see that this arrangement sets the LHS and the
RHS of PICL constraint equal to each other, thus eliminating the providerís incentive to
manipulate information. Notice that the public good is under-provided in Cm (qmM < q
$
M
and qmL < q
$
L) for ' 2 (1=2; ') :When it is more likely that a user is the high-valuation type
(the type receiving information rent), it is optimal for the provider to reduce the source of
the usersí information rents when removing her own manipulation incentive.
In addition to the bunching presented in Proposition 2 above, there are other ways to
keep the public good provider from manipulating information. To see this, consider the
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binding (PICL) presented below:
2plL ' c (qL) = 2plM ' c (qM ) :
From this equation, instead of bunching the two outcomes for 0 = L and 0 = M; the
provider can reduce the payment plM in the RHS to discourage herself from information
manipulation. Notice that, although lowering this payment relaxes the constraint, it comes
at the cost of providing a low-valuation user with a strictly positive rent when he is paired
with a high-valuation user. Another way to discourage the provider from manipulating
information would be to ináate the level of public good qM in the RHS, so that the value
generated by it for low-valuation users would not justify the cost of producing it. As will
be shown below, when a user is more likely to be the low-valuation type, the provider Önds
it optimal to use a combination of these two approaches to deal with her own incentive to
manipulate information.
In order to present our results for ' 2 ('; 1=2), we Örst introduce the following condition.
Condition 1 2%lq̂L ' c (q̂L) + 2%lq$H ' c (q
$
H), where q̂L is deÖned by:








When Condition 1 holds, the principalís gain from misrepresenting the usersí collective
valuation is signiÖcantly large when the reports from the users indicate 0 = L: That is, it
becomes tremendously costly for the provider to keep herself from manipulating information.
As a result, she will make a drastic choice in the optimal contract as we show below.18 The
next proposition presents the optimal outcome when the condition holds.
Proposition 3 Suppose Condition 1 holds. For ' 2 ('; 1=2), the optimal contract Cm










L = q̂L < q
$
L.
A high-valuation user receives a rent, and a low-valuation user receives a rent when paired
with a high-valuation user.
Proof. See Appendix E.
18Whether or not Condition 1 holds depends on the parameter values and the cost functionís curvature.
In the working paper version, we provide a numerical example that satisÖes the condition.
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As mentioned above, the manipulative public good provider can prevent herself from
misrepresenting the usersí collective valuation by distorting the size of public good and/or
decreasing the payment from the low-valuation user when he is paired with a high-valuation
user. Recall from Proposition 2 that, when it is more likely that a user is the high-valuation
type (' > 1=2), the optimal way to prevent the providerís manipulation is pooling the
outcome for 0 = M with the outcome for 0 = L: The bunching with public good under-
provision e§ectively prevents the providerís manipulation, and at the same time, limiting
her rent provision to a high-valuation user.
When it is more likely that a user is the low-valuation type (' < 1=2), the optimal
way to prevent the providerís manipulation entails increasing qM , thus increasing the cost
of production for 0 = M; which in turn prevents the provider from misrepresenting 0 = L
as 0 = M (a larger qM implies a larger rent provision to a high-valuation user, but it is
more likely that a user is the low-valuation type). Proposition 3 exhibits an extreme case.
When it becomes signiÖcantly hard for the provider to incentivize herself for a truthful




H); and also give a
strictly positive rent to a low-valuation user paired with a high-valuation user in the optimal
contract. This implies an overproduction of the public good when the users have di§erent
valuations (qmM > q
$
M )ówhen a user is more likely to be the high-valuation type, as long as
at least one of the users has a high valuation for the public good, the provider may prefer to
set the production at the Örst-best level corresponding to all users having high valuation.
Comparison of qmL (= q̂L) with the conditions deÖning the Örst-best and the second-best
outcomes reveals that q̂L is in between qnL and q
$
L for ' 2 ('; 1=2) and exactly equal to q
n
L
for ' = '. This implies that Condition 1 is violated at ' = '.19 When Condition 1 does not
hold, the participation constraint (PClM ) of the low-valuation user becomes binding in the
optimal contract. As we have seen in Proposition 2, one way to satisfy constraints (PClM )
and (PICL) simultaneously is setting the public good level qM of the intermediate-value
state equal to the public good level qL of the low-value state. As illustrated in Figure 1,
concavity of function 2%lq'c (q) (together with the Inada condition that limq!1 c0 (q) =1)
implies the existence of another level for qM which achieves this objective but higher than
the Örst-best public good level q$L. We deÖne ~q (qL) as this higher level of qM (> q
$
L) that
would satisfy the (PICL) constraint as an equality:
~q (qL) = max fqM : 2%lqM ' c (qM ) = 2%lqL ' c (qL)g :
19When ' = ', the second-best outcome satisÖes the (PICL) constraint as an equality. Accordingly,
2$lq̂L ! c (q̂L) > 2$lqnL ! c (qnL) = 2$lqnM ! c (qnM ) > 2$lq!H ! c(q!H).
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The following proposition presents the outcome in the optimal contract o§ered by the
manipulative provider when Condition 1 is violated.
Proposition 4 Suppose Condition 1 does not hold. For ' 2 ('; 1=2), the optimal contract





M = ~q (q
m











A high-valuation user receives a rent, and a low-valuation users receives no rent.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Again, when a user is more likely to have low valuation (' < 1=2), it may be optimal for
the provider to prevent her own manipulation incentive by increasing qM beyond the Örst-
best level q$M : Proposition 4 exhibits cases where inducing the providerís truthful behavior
is not as costly as in Proposition 3. Here, the provider leaves no rent to a low-valuation user
by setting the payment from him as large as the value that this user gets from the public
good. At the same time, to prevent the provider from manipulating collective information
from the users, the optimal contract ináates the size of the public good large enough in the
intermediate-value state. As a result, the optimal contract can still lead to an overprovision
of the public good for 0 =M:
The propositions in this section characterized the optimal contract o§ered by the ma-
nipulative provider for the entire range of ':20 For the extreme values of ', the providerís
manipulation is not an issue and the optimal contract is the same as the second-best con-
tract given in Proposition 1. If ' is larger than but close enough to 1/2, Proposition 2
yields the optimal contract, which bunches the low and intermediate collective valuations
at the same public good level. If ' is smaller than but close enough to 1/2, the optimal
contract is given either by Proposition 3 or by Proposition 4, depending on whether or not
Condition 1 holds. For these latter values of ', the public good can be overprovided and
even the low-valuation users may receive a positive rent.21
In short, the providerís manipulation incentive and hence the direction of distortion in
the public good size is determined by the likelihood of high valuation by the users. For
20For completeness, we note that when ' = 1=2, there is a continuum of contracts maximizing the
providerís expected payo§. The optimal public good and payment levels are given as in Proposition 3 for
these contracts, except for the level of qM which can take any value within the set [q̂L;min f~q (q̂L) ; q!Hg].
21 In a single-agent setting, Beaudry (1994) shows that the privately informed principal may leave a rent
to the agent without private information.
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extreme ranges of the likelihood, the provider has no incentive to manipulate. For an in-
termediate range, her manipulation incentive becomes an issue. Within that range, when
it is more likely that the users have high valuation, the public good is still underprovided.
When it is less likely that the users have high valuation, however, the providerís manipula-
tion incentive may lead to overprovision of the public good.
The central message in this section is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If the public good provider is manipulative, then the optimal contract may
entail over-provision of the public good.
6 Welfare E§ects
Having characterized the optimal manipulation-proof contract for all the parameter constel-
lations, we now provide a discussion of the welfare e§ects of the manipulability of collective
information. Our analysis indicates that the providerís opportunity to manipulate comes at
a cost. When designing the contract, the provider has to persuade the users that she will
not falsify the information that they will report to her. This consideration imposes a new
incentive constraint for the public good provision contract, on top of the standard condi-
tions securing the usersí participation and their truthful reporting. It follows from Lemma
1 that, as long as there is a su¢cient level of uncertainty about the usersí valuations for
the public good (as long as ' 2 (';')), this new constraint is violated by the second-best
contract. In this case, the optimal manipulation-proof contract brings in a lower payo§ for
the provider relative to the second best.
The source of the usersí payo§s in the second-best contract is their private information.
A high-valuation user should be given an information rent, so that he would not choose to
misreport his valuation. This information rent is increasing in qL and qM , the public good
levels supplied for the low-valuation user. When high valuations are more likely than low
valuations (' 2 (1=2; ')), Proposition 2 tells us that the manipulation-proofness constraint
would have di§erent e§ects on these two public good levels: The optimal qL is weakly
higher and the optimal qM is lower than their second-best values. Hence the e§ect of
manipulability on the usersí payo§s is ambiguous. By contrast, when low valuations are
more likely (' 2 ('; 1=2)), we know from Propositions 3 and 4 that the optimal levels of
both qL and qM are higher than in the second best. Therefore the high-valuation user is
better o§ in this case, with the introduction of the providerís manipulation opportunities.
Proposition 3 also points to the possibility that even the low-valuation user may receive a
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strictly positive payo§ in the intermediate-value state. The provider tolerates leaving a rent
to this user in order to strengthen her commitment not to misrepresent the low-value state
as the intermediate-value one.
In sum, the providerís ability to manipulate lowers her own expected payo§, but the users
may strictly prefer to interact with a provider who is known to be capable of manipulation.
Examination of the change in the optimal levels of qL and qM would also give an idea
on whether the increase in the usersí payo§s compensate for the loss in the providerís. If
' 2 ('; 1=2) and there is no overprovision of the public good (if the optimal manipulation-
proof level of qM is lower than its Örst-best value q$M ), then the providerís manipulability
improves the sum of the providerís and the usersí expected payo§s, because both qL and
qM get closer to their Örst-best values under the optimal manipulation-proof contract.
The next corollary follows directly from the discussion here.
Corollary 3 Suppose ' 2 ('; 1=2):
, If Condition 1 holds, then the users, regardless of their valuation of the public good,
strictly prefer to deal with a manipulative provider.
, If Condition 1 does not hold and qmM < q
$
M , then the sum of all partiesí expected payo§
is higher with a manipulative provider.
The corollary above identiÖes conditions under which we can interpret the providerís
ability to manipulate as a countervailing force that reduces her power to extract the usersí
rents. It suggests, at Örst sight, the counter intuitive result that the users would prefer
a setting in which the provider could manipulate. Yet, this statement requires a careful
interpretationóif the users can a§ect the institutional environment, they would be better
served with more direct ways to limit the providerís rent extraction than doing so indirectly
by taking the environment to where the providerís manipulation is easier. It is, however,
worthwhile to point out that the result is supportive of privacy concerns that reduce trans-
parency and thereby increase the providerís ability to manipulate.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a rationale for an overprovision of public goods that is
based on the presence of private information. In doing so, we analyzed contracting for a
public good between a provider and users with private valuations for the public good. The
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usersí private information causes a distortion in the size of the public good o§ered to them
and such distortions may lead to the providerís incentive to manipulate. We have shown
that, once the public good provider extracts the usersí private information, she may have an
incentive to misrepresent the collective information from the users.22 Our results suggest
that the providerís manipulation ability determines the direction of distortion in public
good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, her optimal contract underprovides
the public good. If she is manipulative, however, public goods can be overprovided. In
such cases, not only the high-valuation users of the public good, but also the low-valuation
ones may obtain positive rents. Lastly, we have shown that all users, regardless of their
valuations, can receive higher rents when the provider is manipulative, thus suggesting
that, for strategic reasons, the users may want to contract with a provider who is capable
of manipulating information.
For simplicity, we assumed two users in our model, but our qualitative results hold for
more than two users. In fact, with more users, the providerís manipulation opportunities
increase. To see this, suppose there are three users. Then the collective value of the users
can be one of the four values: 0 2 fH;M;M;Lg; where M and M represent the case with
two high-valuation users and the case with one such user respectively. The output schedule
when the provider is non-manipulative will be qnH > q
n
M

















L: Thus, when the provider is manipulative, her incentive
to manipulate the collective valuation arises. Depending on '; the provider may have an
incentive to misrepresent 0 = L as 0 = M or M (if qnM is closer to q
$
L; then she will
misrepresent 0 = L as 0 =M and vice versa), and also 0 =M as 0 =M .23
Again, to make our point in a simple setup, we allowed each user to have two possible
valuations for the public good. Our qualitative results continue to hold with an enlarged
set of types. Suppose that a userís type can be i 2 fh;m; lg: With these three types, in our
two-user model, the collective valuation 0 can have six potential values, giving the provider
more opportunities to manipulate.
One of the key assumptions in our model is that a user can opt out, if he anticipates
a strictly negative payo§ after receiving the providerís report about collective valuation of
22See Celik et al. (2019) for a study on the linkage between the principalís incentive to manipulate the
information from the agents and the optimal structures of the organization. In that paper, the transfers
are restricted to be equal even when the agentsí types are di§erent, resulting in no over-production in the
optimal contract.
23Also, in our two-user model, the optimal contract allows the users to indirectly learn each otherís
valuations, but that is not the case when there are more than two users.
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the public good. Without such a limited liability of the users, the manipulative provider
can still achieve the second-best outcome by trading o§ payments from low-valuation users.
The binding participation constraint for a low-valuation user, with no limited liability, is:
' (%lqM ' plM ) + (1' ') (%lqL ' plL) = 0:
As can be seen from the equation, the provider has an extra degree of freedomóshe can make
a low-valuation userís ex post payo§ positive for 0 = M by decreasing plM ; and negative
for 0 = L by increasing plL without altering the public good sizes from the second-best
level in each state. This allows the manipulative provider to achieve the second best, but
with the drawback that it violates the userís ex post participation constraint. In practice,
such a violation may be feasible in some situations, but not in others. For example, for a
public good provision such as a local governmentís highway construction, Önanced by tax
revenue, a user is not able to opt out. For a public good such as a class-action lawsuit, on
the other hand, one can choose to opt out of a class action, and not be able to claim part
of any settlement funds or court award that results from the case.24
Another important assumption in our model is that the public good providerís mecha-
nism treats the users symmetrically when determining the size of the public good and the
payments from the users. If the provider could condition the public good level for interme-
diate collective value, qM ; on which user has the high valuation and which user has the low
valuation, then any manipulation attempt by the provider would have been detectable by
observing the size of the provision. In many applications, the symmetric treatment assump-
tion is justiÖed by a fairness consideration imposed on the provider. In addition, when the
number of the users is large, it may be too costly for the provider to arrange an asymmetric
treatment of the users in practice.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The non-manipulative providerís optimal contract Cn maximizes (P) subject to (PClM ),
(PClL), (PChH), (PChM ), (ICh) and (ICl). We follow the usual procedure of considering
a relaxed problem with only the constraints (PClM ), (PClL) and (ICh), and ignoring the
remaining three. Since the providerís payo§ is increasing in plM and plL from low-valuation
users and the expected payment 'phH + (1' ') phM from high-valuation users, (PClM ),
24See Klono§ (2017).
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(PClL) and (ICh) are binding. These binding constraints give the following expressions:
plL = %lqL;
plM = %lqM ;
'phH + (1' ') phM = '[%hqH '*%qM ] + (1' ')[%hqM '*%qL]:
Maximizing the objective function in P after substituting out these payments yields qnL; q
n
M
and qnH : From the expressions of the payments from the users, it follows that a high-valuation
userís expected rent is strictly positive unless qM = qL = 0; and a low-valuation userís rent
is always zero. What remains is showing that we can Önd individual levels of payments phH
and phM that would satisfy the ignored constraints of (PChH), (PChM ) and (ICl). First,
from the Örst order conditions for the optimal public good levels in the proposition, notice
that qnM = 0 for ' ! (%h + %l)=2%h and q
n
L = 0 for ' ! %l=%h: Since (%h + %l)=2%h > %l=%h;
if qnM = 0 then q
n











L in any case. Consider now the levels of these payments which would satisfy
(ICh) in the ex-post sense:
phH = plM + %h (qH ' qM ) ,
phM = plL + %h (qM ' qL) .





and (PChM ) are satisÖed with these payments. Also, (ICl) holds with zero on either side
of the weak inequality. "
B. Proof of Lemma 1
With the outcome in Cn, we can re-write (PICL) by using the binding (PClM ) and (PClL):
2%lq
n




M ' c (q
n
M ) :
Function 2%lq ' c (q) is concave in q and maximized at q$L. It follows from the Örst-order
conditions in Proposition 1 that 3' ( (%h + %l)=2%h is the lowest level of ' under which
the provider chooses to shut down unless both users report high values. If ' ! 3', then
qnL = q
n
M = 0 and (PICL) holds as an equality. For ' 2 [1=2; 3'), the Örst order conditions




L and therefore (PICL) is violated.




M ) and (PICL) is satisÖed.
Existence of the threshold value ' follows from the fact that the left hand side of (PICL)
decreases and its right hand side increases in ' on the interval [0; 1=2]. "
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C. Proof of Lemma 2
We Örst try setting payments phM and phH equal to the values that would satisfy a high-
valuation userís incentive compatibility conditions in the ex-post sense: phH = plM +
%h (qH ' qM ) and phM = plL + %h (qM ' qL). The participation constraints for a low-
valuation user, (PClM ) and (PClL); imply that these payments also satisfy (PChH) and
(PChM ). Constraint (ICl) holds provided that (ICh) is binding and the public good levels
are monotonic (qL + qM + qH): Pretending to have high valuation would bring a lower
payo§ than the equilibrium payo§ to a low-valuation user, regardless of the other userís
type. So, if (PICH) is satisÖed as well, then the proof is complete.
Suppose (PICH) is violated with the above values of phM and phH . In such a case, we
increase phH and reduce phM such that both (ICh) and (PICH) hold as equalities:
phH = 'plM + '%h (qH ' qM ) + (1' ') plL + (1' ') %h (qM ' qL) + (1' ')
c (qH)' c (qM )
2
,
phM = 'plM + '%h (qH ' qM ) + (1' ') plL + (1' ') %h (qM ' qL)' '
c (qH)' c (qM )
2
.
Constraint (PChM ) still holds, because we are reducing the payment phM that the user
makes in this state of nature. Constraint (PChH) is satisÖed as well, because c (qH) '
c (qM ) + 2%h (qH ' qM ) under convexity of c (") ; and therefore:
phH + '%lqM + %h (qH ' qM ) + (1' ') %lqL + (1' ') %h (qM ' qL)
= %hqH ' ' (%h ' %l) qM ' (1' ') (%h ' %l) qL + %hqH :
Showing (ICl) holds is more involved for this case because of the ëmaxí operators repre-
senting the userís opportunity to opt out of the contract. First notice that the expected
equilibrium payo§ of the low-valuation user is higher than the expected payo§ of pretending
to be high-valuation and opting in the contract regardless of the other userís type. This is
due the fact that (ICh) is binding and the public good levels are monotonic (qL + qM + qH).
What remains to show is the suboptimality of imitating a high-valuation user and then opt-
ing out depending on the type of the other user. This imitation is not proÖtable when the
other user has high valuation, because phH is now higher than plM + %h (qH ' qM ). On the
other hand, in the case that the other user has low valuation, the imitation payo§ is:
%lqM ' phM
= %lqM ' 'plM ' '%h (qH ' qM )' (1' ') plL ' (1' ') %h (qM ' qL) + '
c (qH)' c (qM )
2
+ %lqM ' 'plM ' (1' ') plL ' (1' ') %h (qM ' qL)
= ' (%lqM ' plM ) + (1' ') (%lqL ' plL)' (1' ') (%h ' %l) (qM ' qL) ,
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where the inequality follows from the convexity of c (") again. Because this payo§ is smaller
than the expected equilibrium payo§ of ' (%lqM ' plM ) + (1' ') (%lqL ' plL) for a low-
valuation user, constraint (ICl) is satisÖed. "
D. Proof of Proposition 2
For proof of the proposition, we Örst consider a relaxed problem in Lemma 3 below where
we look for the outcome that maximizes the providerís objective function in (P) subject
to (ICh); (PClM ); (PClL) and (PICL) constraints, ignoring (ICl); (PChH); (PChM ) and
(PICH) constraintsówe will also refer to this lemma for proofs of all remaining propositions.
Lemma 3 Suppose ' 2 (';'). At the solution to the relaxed problem, payment levels are
given by the binding (ICh), (PClL) and (PICL) constraints. The public good levels qH ; qM
and qL are chosen to maximize:
'2 [2%hqH ' c (qH)] + ' (1' 2') [2%lqM ' c (qM )] + (1' ' (1' ')) [2%lqL ' c (qL)] ( eP)
+2' (1' 2') (%h ' %l) qM ' 2' (1' ') (%h ' %l) qL;
subject to
2%lqM ' c (qM ) ! 2%lqL ' c (qL) : (gPC lM )
Proof. Because the objective function is decreasing in phH , phM , plL and constraint
(PICL) is relaxed with a lower value of plL, constraints (ICh) and (PClL) are binding for
the outcome solving the relaxed problem. It follows from Lemma 1 that (PICL) is binding
for ' 2 (';'). We can rewrite the expected payment to the provider by substituting in
these constraints:
'22phH + 2' (1' ') phM + 2' (1' ') plM + (1' ')2 2plL
= 2%lqL + '
22%hqH + ' (1' 2') 2%hqM ' ' (1' ') 2%hqL + 'c (qM )' 'c (qL) :
Once the expected cost of public good provision is taken into account, the providerís objec-
tive function reduces to the objective in ( eP). Similarly, constraint (PClM ) can be rewritten
as (gPC lM ) after substituting in the binding constraints of (PICL) and (PClL).
We now move on to the proof of Proposition 2. We will start with ignoring (ICl);
(PChH); (PChM ) and (PICH) constraints and maximizing the providerís objective function
subject to (ICh); (PClM ); (PClL) and (PICL) constraints only, as in Lemma 3. The solution
to the relaxed problem will be the one identiÖed by the proposition. Since the solution in
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the proposition satisÖes the hypothesis of Lemma 2, there exists an outcome that solves the
relaxed problem and that satisÖes the ignored constraints.
For ' > 1=2, the objective function ( eP) is convex in qM . Therefore (gPC lM ) constraint
is satisÖed as an equality at the solution to this maximization. This equality holds when
qM = qL. Given concavity of function 2%lq ' c (q), the equality may also be satisÖed when
one variable is strictly higher than the other. This will not be the case for the outcome
solving the maximization problem: Holding 2%lqM ' c (qM ) and 2%lqL' c (qL) constant, the
objective function is decreasing in both qL and qM (when ' > 1=2). This proves that the
optimal outcome is a bunching outcome (qM = qL). The Örst order condition yields:
c0 (qM ) = c




where the weak inequality holds as equality if qM = qL > 0.
Finally, Lemma 2 implies that we can Önd individual levels of phM and phH (for instance,
phM = %lqL and phH = %lqL+%h (qH ' qL)) that satisfy the ignored (ICl); (PChH), (PChM )
and (PICH) constraints. "
E. Proof of Proposition 3
Ignoring (ICl); (PChH); (PChM ) and (PICH) constraints, it follows from Lemma 3 that
the providerís problem turns into maximization of ( eP) by choosing qH ; qM and qL subject
to (gPC lM ). When we ignore (gPC lM ) constraint as well, the problem is an unconstrained
optimization problem and the Örst order conditions yield the values of outputs qH ; qM ; and
qL as stated in the proposition. The payments plL, plM , and 'phH + (1' ') phM are given





















+ (1' ') %h (qmH ' q
m
L ) .
The solution satisÖes the ignored (gPC lM ) constraint because:
2%lqM ' c (qM ) = 2%lq$H ' c(q
$
H) ! 2%lq̂L ' c (q̂L) :
The existence of the individual values of phH and phM satisfying the ignored (ICl);
(PChH); (PChM ) and (PICH) constraints follow from Lemma 2. For instance, setting these
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payments equal to each other would work:
phH = phM = %lqL + '
c (qH)' c (qL)
2
+ (1' ') %h (qH ' qL) . "
F. Proof of Proposition 4
Following the proof of the previous propositions, we maximize the providerís objective
function, ignoring (ICl); (PChH); (PChM ) and (PICH) constraints. The payments plL,























From Lemma 3, this problem turns into maximization of ( eP) by choosing qH ; qM and qL
subject to (gPC lM ). The constraint is bindingóotherwise, the Örst order conditions yield
that qM = q$H and qL = q̂L, violating (gPC lM ) since:
2%lqM ' c (qM ) = 2%lq$H ' c(q
$
H) < 2%lq̂L ' c (q̂L) :
Holding 2%lqL ' c (qL) and 2%lqM ' c (qM ) constant, the objective function is decreasing
in qL but increasing in qM (for ' < 1=2). This proves that qL < q$L and qM = ~q (qL) ;
where ~q (qL) = max fqM : 2%lqM ' c (qM ) = 2%lqL ' c (qL)g : Since q$M is the the maximizer
of (%h+%l)qM ' c (qM ) ; if the gap between %h and %l is small enough, q$M will be in between
q$L and ~q (qL) ; implying that qM = ~q (qL) > q
$
M . If the gap between %h and %l is not small
enough, then qM = ~q (qL) < q$M :
Lemma 2 implies that we can Önd individual levels of phM and phH that satisfy the
ignored (ICl); (PChH); (PChM ) and (PICH) constraints. "
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